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Abstract
This paper explores the problem of sequential and irreversible technology choice in
the presence of network externalities when the technologies stochastically evolve over time.
Early potential users are shown to adopt an irreversible technology too early compared to
the social optimum. The effect of increasing the uncertainty of the technologies on early
potential user's decision is analyzed. We find that the sponsor of new emerging
technology might choose too safe a research strategy. We also study the consequences of
allowing side payments between generations of consumers, and demonstrate that ex post
optimal policy can impair ex ante social welfare.
I. Introduction
In an environment where technology evolves stochastically over time, potential
users making a technology choice must consider whether the best available technology
today will remain a good technology in the future; this is especially important when the
technology choice is largely an irreversible one. For instance, personal computers are
designed around a microprocessor which embodies an architecture that is often proprietary
and incompatible with other microprocessors. Apple computers are designed around the
"Motorola" microchip. IBM compatibles are built around the 'Intel" microchip while Sun
Microsystems workstations are based on the Sun's "Sparc" architecture. After committing
to a microprocessor, switching to another one can be extremely costly; it might involve
extensive redesign of the product, or a total washout of costs incurred in the development
of customized software. Another possibility is retraining cost to get acquainted with the
new technology - see Banerjee and Summers (1986), Farrell (1985), and Klemperer (1984)
for more on the implications of the costs of switching.
The importance of the technology choice becomes more acute in the presence of
network externalities. In this case, the danger of a user choosing the wrong technology is
not only that she will have an inferior technology ex post, but also that she faces the
possibility of being stranded by other people who adopt a different and incompatible
technology. In this paper we investigate the implications of network externalities on the
irreversible technology choice when competing and inherently incompatible technologies
evolve over time stochastically.
There are two strands of literature related to this paper: one in the area of the optimal
stopping rule in an irreversible investment decision problem, and the other in the area of
compatibility and standardization. In the irreversible investment literature, McDonald and
Siegel (1986) study the optimal timing of investment in an irreversible project where the
value of the project follows continuous time stochastic processes in the absence of network
externalities - see also Baldwin (1982) and Pindyck (1988). Balcer and Lippman (1984)
also consider a situation where a firm must decide whether to adopt the best currently
available technology or to postpone adoption in anticipation of better technology in the near
future. Their focus is not on the externalities exerted upon one generation of consumers by
another generation. In the literature of compatibility and network externalities, Farrell and
Saloner (1986) investigate the implications of an installed base for the adoption of
technologies with network externalities. However, in their model, the new technology
becomes available unexpectedly, and as a consequence, the option of waiting is not
considered to be an alternative strategy.1 Katz and Shapiro (1992) allows the option to
wait for consumers in a model of product introduction with network externalities. The
value of technology changes over time in their model, but it is known with certainty in
advance. As a consequence, in their perfect foresight equilibria, consumers never exercise
their option to wait Moreover, their focus is on the supplier. In particular, the timing of
product introduction and the incentive to achieve compatibilities with the installed base are
examined. In contrast to this paper, Choi (1990) and Waldman (1989) analyze the case
where the technology choice is not irreversible and consumers are allowed to make repeat
purchases. In that context, they provide a formal theory of planned obsolescence based on
incompatible technologies in the presence of network externalities.
The paper is organized in the following way. In section II, we outline the formal
model. Then, we study the pattern of technology adoption that would be induced by
private agents, and compare this outcome with the outcome induced by a welfare-
maximizing social planner. Section HI deals with a special case where a newly emerging
technology is competing with an established and mature one. We also analyze a situation in
which new technology is sponsored and the sponsor of it can choose the riskiness of
research strategy. In section IV we allow side payments between generations of consumers
1
 They, however, allow the possibility of waiting by consumers in the analysis of product
pre- announcements.
and and examine the ex ante welfare implication of ex post policy intervention. Concluding
remarks follow.
II. The Model
In this section, we lay out a general formulation of the model and study the users'
coordination problem in adopting irreversible technologies exhibiting network externalities.
There are two time periods, t=l, 2. There are also two potential users, 1 and 2, who arrive
sequentially at time t=l and 2, respectively. Potential user 1 will be referred to as an
earlycomer and 2, as a latecomer. There exist two competing incompatible technologies A
and B. In period 1, the earlycomer contemplates choosing one of available technologies.
She has three options from which to choose. One is to choose technology A, and another
is to choose B. The third option is to wait until period 2 when she can make an optimal
choice given how the technologies have evolved. In period 2, a new potential consumer 2
arrives on the scene and makes a technology adoption choice, given the choice of user 1.
The discount factor is given by 8. The value of each technology is revealed at the
beginning of each period and evolves stochastically. More specifically, the value of each
technology in period 1 is given by a j and p j , respectively, if the technology is used by
only one player (stand-alone benefit). The stand-alone values of technologies in period 2
are random variables from the viewpoint of a potential adopter in period 1, which will be
revealed at the beginning of period 2. The stochastic nature of the value of technology can
be considered to be due to the uncertain availability of complementary or substitute goods.
Another possibility is that the potential value of a technology is very hard to predict in the
early stage of development. For our purpose, the process of technology evolution is an
exogenous one independent of any buyer's decision.2 The type of research performed at
2This is not an innocuous assumption since new knowledge can be generated by the use of
a specific product (learning by using). See Rosenberg (1982) for an illuminating analysis
and evidence on economic activities involving learning.
universities or funded by government, the outcome of which is supplied competitively,
would fall in this category.3 Denoting by «2 and p2 the values of each technology in
period 2, we assume that they are nonnegative real numbers with common support, [0,
v].4 There is a joint probability distribution of the value of technologies, G(ct2 , p2). We
also denote by A, the value each user attaches to the network externalities conferred when
the other user adopts the same technology. That is, if the consumer adopts technology A
(B) alone, then his benefit from the technology is given by (X2 (P2) while he derives the
benefit of (X2 + A (P2 + A) if the other user also adopts technology A (B). Here, we
assume symmetry in the value each user attaches to compatibility. The basic results in this
paper hold if asymmetry is allowed. Also, the assumption of only one user arriving in
each period should not be considered a limitation of this model. If we allowed a cohort of
N\ and N2 people to arrive in the first and in the second period, the analysis would be
almost identical to the one in this paper, provided that the assumption of coordination on
the Pareto-superior outcome within -the-period is maintained. This extension of the model
would only lead to minor changes in the interpretation of the results.
A. Market Outcome
Now consider how the technology adoption decisions unfold in the market place.
Let £1 = {((X2 , p2); (0:2 , p2)e [0, v]2} be the sample space of the values of the
technologies in period 2. Define the following sets:
Eo = {(S2 , p2); 5 2 > p2 , (52 , p2)e [0,
3In the terminology of Katz and Shapiro (1986), the technology is nonsponsored. See
section El, however, for the case of sponsored technology.
4More generally, 0:2 and p2 can take negative values. The value of each technology can
be restricted to be greater than or equal to zero, since the user has the option of not using
the technology. If we embrace this interpretation, the (marginal) distribution of the value of
each of the technologies would be a mix of the original distribution truncated below zero
and atom at zero.
Ex = {(a2 , P2); a 2 + A > p2 , (a2 , p2)e [0, v]2}
E2 = {(S2 , p2); a 2 + 2A > p 2 , (a 2 , p 2 ) e [0, v]2}
The complement of a set E with respect to the space Q will be denoted by Ec. Note that
c E2, and (E2 - EJ ) = ( E ^ - E2C) = {(a2 , P2); a 2 + 2A > p2 > a 2 + A , (S2 ,
[0,y]2}.
v
Figure 1. Definition of Relevant Sets in the Space of the Values of Technologies
We solve the problem by backward induction. Suppose that user 1 has adopted
technology A in the first period. Then user 2 also adopts technology A if and only if
(1) 52+A >p2
i.e., the realizations of the technology values belong to set Ej. Otherwise, user 2 will
adopt technology B. We can derive a similar condition in the case where user 1 has
adopted technology B in period 1.
Now consider the situation where user 1 has decided to delay adoption until period
2. There are two cases to examine. If I p2 -0:2 I > A, then the dominant strategy for each
player is to choose the technology whose stand alone benefit is higher. If I 02 -0:2 I < A ,
then the difference in the stand alone benefit is not great enough for each player to make a
technology choice regardless of the choice of the other. There are two Nash equilibria.
One has both players choosing technology A, and the other has both players choosing
technology B. However, these two equilibria are Pareto-comparable. We will assume that
players can coordinate their choices within the period, so that they can end up with a
Pareto-optimal choice.5 The consequence of this assumption is that technology A will be
adopted if EQ occurs and B will be adopted if EQC occurs. There is always a benefit from
the network externality, since compatibility is always achieved, provided that the early
adoptor has chosen the option of waiting.
Given the equilibrium outcome of the second period for each subgame, we are
ready to investigate the optimal decision of user 1 in period 1. If she decides to wait until
period 2, then her expected payoff is given by,
(2) V(W) = 5 E[max (S2 , P2 ) + A ]
= 8A (X2 dG((X2, P2) + p 2 dG(cc2, P2)I
If she adopts technology A in the first period, then her expected payoffs are given by
5 One way to justify this within the period coordination assumption would be to introduce
an intertemporal structure to the technology adoption process within the period. If the
consumers make adoption decisions in a predetermined order, then the Pareto-optimal
outcome would be the only subgame perfect equilibrium with complete information. See
Farrell and Saloner (1985) for details.
7(3) V(A) = tt! + 5 E{ (5t2 + A ) IEl[((X2 , (32 )] + (X2 IEJ [(S2 , p2 )]}
r ~ ~ ~ r ~ ~ ~
(a2 + A)dG(a2, p2) + a2 dG(a2, p2)
JEI M
+ 5
where I [.] is an indicator function. Similarly, her expected payoff from adopting
technology B in the first period is given by,
V(B) = B ,+5E{(p2 + A ) I r ~ . A s, S, , [(O2 , jfe
She will compare V(W), V(A), and V(B), and select the strategy which gives her the
highest expected payoffs.
B. Social Optimum
Now consider the optimal choice of technology from the social planner's
viewpoint. Social welfare is defined by the sum of the utilities of two potential users. First
consider the socially optimal decision in the second period given the choice of the first
period. If user 1 has made an irreversible choice of A in period 1, then the socially optimal
choice by user 2 is also A, if and only if 2(ot2 + A ) > (X2 + P2 , i.e.,
(4) 0C2 + 2A > p2
The social optimum dictates that the same technology A be adopted by the second period
user if (and only if) the value of technologies lie in set E2, while the same technology is
adopted in the market equilibrium if (and only if) the value of technologies lie in set Ej.
The discrepancy arises from the fact that user 2 does not take into account the negative
externalities he imposes on user 1 by adopting the incompatible technology forcing user 2
to be stranded away. Another interpretation is that user 2 does not consider the positive
network externalities he confers on user 1 by adopting the same technology. Since Ej <z
8E2, the market outcome induces user 2 to adopt the technology which is incompatible to
that chosen by user lin more cases than the social optimum dictates.6
If user 1 deferred her decision, then the socially optimal choice in period 2 is to
choose the best technology available at that time and is the same as the individually optimal
choice.
We now consider the "first-best" benchmark. We search for the socially optimal
decision by user 1 in the first period, given that the second period technology choice is also
made in a socially optimal way. If user 1 waits in the first period, the expected social
surplus is given by
(5) S(W) = 25 E[max (0C2 , p2 ) + A ] = 2 V(W)
If user 1 adopts one of the two technologies, then the expected social surplus is given by
(6) S(A) = 04 + 8 E{ 2 (5 2 + A ) IE2[(52 , P2 )] + (S2 + p2) IEJ [(S2 , p2)]}
= eel + 5
[ [
2 (0C2 + A) dG(52 , p2) + (0C2 + p2) dG(OC2, p2)
ho M
(7) S(B) = p 1 + 5 E { 2 ( p 2 + A ) I [ r 2A> 5 2 ]
We say that an outcome is efficient if it maximizes the net social payoff among (5) - (7).
There are two opposing forces which lead the private decision in the first period to
diverge from the socially optimal decision in the first period. First, user 1 confers positive
externalities on user 2 by waiting. If she waits, there is always a compatibility based
positive network externality, since both users can coordinate to choose the same
technology in period 2; note that they will choose the best technology available in period 2.
^The phenomenon of inefficient stranding is referred to as excess momentum in Farrell and
Saloner(1986).
However, if she adopts, for example, technology A, then compatibility is achieved only
when the event E2 occurs in the socially optimal outcome. There are two kinds of
negative externalities imposed on user 2 by adopting in period 1. First, in the event of E2C,
user 2 will not reap the benefit of the network externality, A. Second, in the event of (E2 -
EQ ), an inferior technology will be chosen by user 2 to ensure compatibility with the
installed technology of user 1. Since user 1 ignores these externalities, there is a tendency
for the first period consumer to adopt one of the technologies too early compared to the
social optimum. Second, there is an opposing factor which induces user 1 to delay her
technology adoption compared to the social optimum. If she adopts one of the technologies
in the first period (say A), then the probability of being stranded by user 2 is larger in the
market outcome than in the socially optimal one since Ej e E2. We may say that the cost
of adopting the wrong technology in the first period is less costly in the socially optimal
outcome since compatibility can be achieved in the wider circumstances. Therefore, the
option of waiting is more attractive under the market outcome, ceteris paribus. Whether
the technology adoption choice would be made too soon or too late depends on the
magnitude of these three effects. The following proposition, however, shows that the first
two effects dominate the third in the case of ex ante identical technologies.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the two technologies are ex ante symmetric, that is a j = p j ,
and G(OC2 ,p2) = G(P2, 0:2). Then, there is a tendency for the earlycomer to adopt a
technology too soon.
Proof. We would like to show that S(W) - S(A) > V(W) - V(A) so that the incentive for
the society to wait until period 2 is greater than that for individual decision maker. For that
purpose, it is sufficient to have [S(W) - V(W)] - [S(A) - V(A)] > 0. Note that E Q C E J C
E2 , and ( E 2 - El) = (Ejc - E2C) = {(£2 , p2); £2 + 2A > P2 > a 2 + A , (£2 , P2)e [0,
0[S(W) - V(W)] = E[max (a2 , p 2 ) + A
= A
JEO
oc2 dG(a2, 1 1p2 dG(a2, p2) + p2 dG(a2, p2)
5~l[S(A)-V(A)] =
i21 (a2+A)dG(a2,p2)!E2 • ( (a2+ p2)dG(a2,p2) 1 (a2 + A)dG(a2, p2) I
JEi
a2 dG(a2, p2)
= a2dG(a2,p2) + p2dG(a2,p2)
J E 2 JEC2
Therefore,
[S(W) - V(W)] - [S(A) - V(A)]
L LAdG(a2, p2) + I A dG(a2, p2)J E 2 - E I
= 5
?2
AdG(a2, p2) I (p2 - a2) dG(a2,p2) - I
JEO-EO h
dG(a2,p2) - | A dG(oc2, p2)
E2-Ei
The first two terms in the square bracket represent the negative externalities on user 2 when
user 1 decides to adopt technology A in the first period; user 1 does not take these
externalities into account in her decision process. The first term is the lost benefit of
network externalities by having user 1 adopt the ex post wrong technology. The second
term is the expected loss for user 2 from being forced to choose an inferior technology to
ensure compatibility with the installed base. These two effects will induce user 1 to adopt
technology A too early compared to the social optimum. The last term represents the
difference between the socially optimal outcome and the market outcome in the expected
value of adopting technology A. Since compatibility is achieved with a smaller probability
event in the market outcome (Ej vs. E2), the cost of choosing the wrong technology ex
post is more detrimental compared to the socially optimal outcome. The last effect offsets
the first two effects, causing the option of waiting to be more attractive in the market
outcome. However, we show that the second effect alone dominates the third one, leading
to too early adoption in the market solution.
Since the first term is positive and [E2 - El] c [E2 - EO]), we have
[S(W)-V(W)]-[S(A)-V(A)]
£ 8 I (p2 - 52) dG((x2,p2) - A dG(a2,
./E2-E1 ./E2-E1
> 0 ( since [ E 2 - Ex] = {(0C2 , p2); A < p2 - ai < 2A, 0C2 , p2 > 0})
III. Special Case: Pre-established vs. Emerging Technology
Let us assume that 0:2 = ocj = a > 0, P i = 0 and that p2 has a probability
distribution of F(.). We can interpret technology A as pre-established and mature, and B
as an emerging technology, the future value of which is unknown in the first period. Note
that in this case the waiting option dominates the choice of technology B in the first period.
In this section, we will consider two possible property right regimes for technology B: one
in which it is sponsored, and the other one in which it is not. We, however, maintain the
assumption that technology A is competitively supplied.
A. Nonsponsored Emerging Technology
Proposition 2. The social welfare in the first-best outcome (SWp)increases with a mean
preserving spread (Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970)) in the distribution of p2.
Proof. We prove by showing that both the social value of waiting and adopting
technology A increase. Let V(W; F) be the private value of waiting when the distribution
of p2 is given by F(.). Then,
12
V(W;F) = 5A + 5 ccF(a) + p2dF(p2)




5 [V(W; F2) - V(W; F^] = a [F2(a) -
Note that
P2 dF2(p2) -
I P 2 d F 2 ( p 2 ) - |
Ja Ja
2 F2(p2) - p2 dF!(p2)
I  I
Ja Ja
dF2(p2) - p2dF2(p2)I p2 -I
p2 dFi(p2) -
P2 dF!(p2) " I P2 dF!(p2)
=   p2 dF2(p2) (since p2 dFi(p2) = p2 dF2(p2))
I  I
J-~ Ja
I !( 2) J
a Fi(a) - Fi(p2) dp2
Therefore,
[V(W; F2) - V(W; F^] = 5
Ia F2(a) - F2(p2) dp2
r ~ ~ r
F2(p2)dp2-F2(p2)dp2- Fi(p2)dp2 >0
Since the social value of waiting is two times the private value of waiting, [S(W;
S(W;F!)]>0.
13
The social value of adopting the technology A (when the second period adoptor
follows the first best rule), S(A; F) is given by,
S(A;F) = a + 5a + 5 (a + 2A) F (a+ 2A) + p2 dF(p2)
Ja+2A
The rest of the proof is similar to the argument above, and therefore is omitted.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 can be understood by noting that technology A
plays the role of a backstop technology when user 1 decides to wait and see how
technology B develops. Technology B is useful only when the value of technology B is
greater than that of A. Figure 2 depicts the value of waiting as a function of the realization
of P2, conditional on the value of a. The utility function is convex in the value of P2, and
preferences exhibit the property of risk-loving. This so-called "option effect" explains why
increasing the weight in the upper tail of the distribution of P2 by an increase in MPS







Figure 2. Stand-alone Benefits of Waiting, Given the Value of Technology A, a.
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Corollary 1. The private value of waiting also increases with an increase in the MPS.
We can also define the market-induced social welfare (SWM) from each decision in
the first period, in which the social welfare is calculated by assuming that the second-period
decision is made in an individually optimal way. In a similar way, we can also prove the
following:
Corollary 2. The market-induced social welfare (SWM) also increases with a mean
preserving spread in the distribution of p2.
B. Sponsored Emerging Technology
So far, we have assumed that the technologies are in the public domain and that
they are supplied competitively. Now we assume that the emerging technology is being
developed by a monopolist who has an exclusive right to the technology, perhaps due to
patent protection or proprietary knowledge. We also allow the possibility that the choice of
research strategy, 6, by the monopolist can affect the distribution of the research outcome,
F(p2; 6). More specifically, increasing 9 increases the riskiness of the outcome. We
interpret p2 as the value of the technology net of constant marginal cost. The first period
consumer observes the choice of 0 by the monopolist, and makes her own technology
adoption decision.
Here, we ask the following question: will the monopolist choose socially optimal
research strategies? Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) were the first to ask the same question in
the context of entrepreneurs engaged in a "winner-takes-all" patent race. Klette and de
Meza (1986), Bhattacharya and Mookherjee (1986), and Dasgupta and Maskin (1987) also
studied the optimal choice of riskiness in research strategies. They contend that the market
outcome is typically riskier than the socially optimal one. Our result demonstrates that the
previous findings do not necessarily hold in the presence of network externalities. The
incentive constraint limits the riskiness of the research strategy.
When user 1 adopts technology A, the monopolist in the second period must give
user 2 at least the value of o^ + A in order to provide user 2 with the incentive to buy its
technology. Therefore, there will be incompatible technologies only when p2 > 04 + A; in
this case the monopolist will make a profit of p2 - (04 + A). When user 1 waits,
technology B competes with A on the level field since there is no installed base. The
monopolist can sell his technology with positive profit if p2 > a j . The monopolist will
charge a price up to the point where consumers are indifferent between A and B (or B is
slightly preferred to A) and make a profit of 2(p2 - o^). Even though there is transfer of
money from consumers to the monopolist, the technology choice pattern in the second
period is independent of property right regimes. Since a pure transfer of money among
participants of society cancels out in welfare calculations, the social value of waiting and
adopting technology A is also independent of property right regimes. Therefore, we can
conclude that social welfare, regardless of whether the technology choices are made by
private agents or by the social planner, increases with the MPS when there is sponsored
technology.
Proposition 3. The social optimum entails the choice of the riskiest research strategy by
the monopolist.
In contrast, the private value of waiting does not depend on the research strategy
chosen by the monopolist. When the early adoptor decides to wait, there is no installed
base in the second period. Therefore, technology A will be adopted by both consumers if
P2 < 0^ . Otherwise, the monopolist will charge a price of (P2 - 0^ ) and consumers will
be indifferent between technologies A and B. The value of waiting is independent of the
research technology, and is given by V(W) = 5 (aj +A).
Following Bhattacharya and Mookherjee (1986), we put the following restrictions
on the distribution function in order to analyze the effect of the MPS on the private value of
adopting technology A.
(i) Symmetry Condition (S):
The distribution of p2 is symmetric around its mean, i.e., F( p2 + P2; G) = 1 - F(fte
-p2;9) .
(ii) Single Crossing Condition (SC):
The distribution functions of P2 corresponding to two different levels of riskiness
9 and 9' with 0 >9' intersect only once, i.e., F( P2; 9') - F( P2; 9) - 0 according to
p2—P2 , where p2 is the unique intersection point under condition (i).
Figure 3. "Regular" Distributions Satisfying (S) and (SC)
Proposition 4. If F satisfies regularity conditions, as the MPS increases, the adoption of
technology A becomes more (less) attractive for the potential early adoptor if p2 > (<) a j +
A .
Proof. When user 1 adopts technology A, the monopolist should give user 2 at least the
value of OL\ + A in order to provide user 2 the incentive to buy its technology. Therefore,
there will be incompatible technologies only when P2 > 04 + A; in this case, the
monopolist will charge a price of p2 - (o^ + A). Since the probability of being stranded
17
away by user 2 is [1 - F( o^ + A; 6)], the value to user 1 of adopting technology A when
the monopolist chooses research strategy 0 is given by,
V(A; 0) = CCJ + 5 {F( ax + A; 0) (ax +A) + [1 - F( ax + A; Q)]ax ]}
= ax ( l+ 5)+ 8AF(a!+A;0)
By regularity conditions, V(A; 0) is an increasing (a decreasing) function of 0 if P2 > (<)
oci + A. Note that the private value of adoption depends only on the probability of being
stranded away by the second period consumer, which is the same whether or not the
technology is sponsored.




T if technology B is
nonsponsored
No change if technology B
is sponsored
Tifp>oc + A




Table 1. The Effects of the MPS on the Values of Adopting and Waiting
Proposition 5. The monopolist may choose a less risky research strategy than the
socially optimal one if p2 > 04 + A .
Proof. We construct an example as follows, ccj = 12, A = 15, p2 = 30, 8 = 1. P2 has a
uniform distribution with support [30 - 0, 30 + 0], that is, f(x; 0) = — Ip0_ e 30 +
20
G](x), and
8F(x; a) = I [ 3 0 . e, 30 + 6](x)>.if x< 30 + 9
Then,
= 1, ifx>30 + 9
V(A; a) = a ! (1+ 5) + 5AF( a t + A; 6)
= 24 + 15 ( 9 " 3 ) , if e > 3
28
= 24 , if 0< 0 < 3
V(W) = 8 (a! +A) = 27
Therefore, V(W) > V(A; 6) if and only if 0 < 5.
The monopolist's expected profit when it chooses research strategy 0 is given by
IIO) = 2 I [p2-a] f(p2; 0)dp2
*30 + 6
, if0<5




It is easy to check that the monopolist's optimal choice of 0 is 5, while the socially optimal
choice is the maximum value of 0=30 by proposition 2.
Proposition 5 contrasts with the results of Bhattacharya and Mookherjee (1986),
Dasgupta and Maskin (1987), and Klette and de Meza (1986) who showed that market
equilibrium involves excessively risky research projects.
IV. Within -the- Period Side Payments
We have been assuming that side payments between generations of consumers were
prohibited. Now we relax this assumption and allow consumers/ users to make side
payments within the period. Note that a contract between user 1 and user 2 in the first
period is still prohibited. User 2 is not able to agree on a contract (perhaps he is not yet
born). The consequence of side payments is that there will always be efficiency in the
second period.7
In this section, we are especially interested in whether this ex-post efficiency
increases ex-ante social welfare. Let V(W)' be the private value to user 1 of waiting and let
V(A)' be her private value adopting technology A in the first period. It is clear that the
second period side payment does not affect the outcome if user 1 waits; that is, V(W)' =
V(W). If user 1 adopts technology A, then user 2 will adopt the same technology if and
only if E2 occurs due to the side payment Without side payments, inefficiencies arise
only when the event (E2 - Ej) occurs. If that event occurs, the total utilities attainable from
bargaining is 2(0C2 + A), while disagreement yields a total utility of (0:2 + p2).
Therefore, the gains from trade is 2((X2 + A) - (0:2 + P2) = (OL2 + 2A - P2), which will
be divided according to the relative bargaining power of user 1 and user 2. Let \i denote
the relative bargaining power of user 1, where 0< (i <1. Then,
V(A)1 = V(A) + 8 E{ \i{ai + 2A - £2)) I(E2-EI)
= 0Cj + 811, where II is given by
7Since every relevant parameter is common knowledge in this model, the bargaining
process will ensure ex-post efficiency. See Rubinstein (1982) for an example of a
bargaining game where the only subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an immediate
agreement on the division of gains from trade.
20
(cc2 + A)dG(a2, P2) + [012 +|i(a2 + 2A - p2)]dG(cc2, P2) + a 2 dG(a2, P2)
^Ei i(E2-Ei) h\
Similarly, let SM(W)' and SM(A)1 be the market-induced social welfare when user
1 chooses to wait or adopt technology A in the first period. Then, SM(\V)' = SM(W). If
user 1 adopts technology A, then user 2 will adopt the same technology if and only if E2
occurs.
(8) SM(A)' = cc! + 8 E{ 2 (OL2 + A ) i^[(a2 , p2 )] + (a 2 + p2) IE; [(a2 , P2 )]}
+ 8 I (a2 + A) dG(a2, P2) + i
JE2 JE2
2 <X  + ) d ( , P2) + (a2 + P2) dG(a2, P2)
Since the private value of adopting technology A is increasing with the possibility
of side payments, there are three cases to consider.
CASE I. V(W) > V(A)1 > V(A)
In this case, the market outcome induces user 1 to wait in the first period by user 1
under both regimes. Therefore, social welfare does not change with the possibility of side
payments. Side payment in the second period is irrelevant in this case.
CASE II. V(A)1 > V(A) > V(W).
In this case, the market outcome induces user 1 to adopt technology A in both
regimes. Since the technology choice is the same in the first period and there is a
possibility of efficiency gains in the second period, social welfare improves unambiguously
with side payments.
CASE III. V(A)1 > V(W) > V(A).
In this case, user 1 waits in the first period if side payments are not allowed, and
she adopts technology A if side payments are allowed. Since user 2 suffers from the
adoption of technology A by user 1, gains from the possibility of side payments to user 1
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come at the expense of user 2. Social welfare depends on the relative magnitude of these
two effects. The following example demonstrates the case in which ex post efficiency
actually reduce ex ante social welfare.
Example.
Let 0C2 = a ! = a , P2 = a + A + e, where 0< e <A , e= E(e), 8 =1, and p= 1/2.
Then,
V(A)= oc + <x = 2a
V(A)1 = a + a + 1/2 [A - e]
V(W) = E( p2 + A) = E(a + A + e) + A = a + 2A + e
The condition for V(A) < V(W) < V(A)1 is given by
(9) a - 2A < e < I a - A
The market-induced social welfare when user 1 adopts technology A or waits is given by
SM(A) = E[a + (a + P2 )] = 3a + A + e
SM(A)' = a + 2(a + A ) = 3a + 2A
SM(W) = SM(W)' = E[2(p2 + A)] = 2(a + 2A + e)
The condition for SM(W) > Sj^ CA)' is given by
(10) e>|a-A
If conditions (9) and (10) are satisfied, the possibility of side payments changes the market
outcome from (W, B) to (A,A) and reduces the overall social welfare. Even though user 1
always benefits from the possibility of side payments, in this case, she does so at the
expense of user 2. In this case, the ex -post efficiency of side payments hurts user 2.
This result has significant implications for public policy related to standardization.
Suppose that a government agency has the power to impose mandatory compatibility of
new and old technology. For instance, the FTC recently decided to require that any
transmission standard for high-definition TV (HDTV) be compatible with the current
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NTSC standard receivers.8' ^ One danger of this kind of policy is that early users may
adopt inferior technology too soon, in anticipation of public policy which guarantees that
they will not be stranded away. Given the installed base of inferior technology, the best
ex post policy might be a mandatory compatibility requirement for new technologies.
However, as long as this requirement puts technical constraints on the development of new





€=a - 2A e=A
e=2/3a - A
l/2a 2/3a
Figure 2. Ex Ante Efficiency vs. Ex Post Efficiency
8
 Another possible motive for this decision might be to give domestic firms a second chance
to catch up with Japanese and European firms that are far ahead in this field. Since the
transmission methods developed and proposed by foreign countries are incompatible with
the existing NTSC standard, by requiring "backward" compatibility, the policy can put the
U.S. on an equal footing in the development game.
contrast, the Federal Communications Commission adopted a color television system
that was incompatible with the existing black and white system, even though the decision
was overridden by an order of the Director of Defense Mobilization. See Katz and Shapiro
(1986) where they attribute this example to S. Besen.
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V. Concluding Remarks
A simple model of technology adoption, with irreversible technology choice and
network externalities, was presented. The growing literature on compatibility and network
externalities has concentrated on analyzing the coordination problems of standardization,
and if standardization is chosen, determining the standard. Even when the problem is
examined in a dynamic setting, previous research considers only the unexpected arrival of a
new and perhaps superior technology. Therefore, the option of waiting in a technology
adoption decision is not considered explicitly. The value of the waiting option is explicitly
analyzed in the irreversible investment literature, but the decisions are made in a competitive
economy setting, utilizing a decision-theoretic framework without externalities. This
paper combines these two elements and explores the implications of network externalities in
the adoption of irreversible technology.
In our model, the focus has been on the between-period user heterogeneity arising
from the timing of adoption decisions. All consumers have the same preference (within-
period homogeneity) towards the value of technologies as long as no prior commitment to
any technology has been made. However, there is an incongruity in preferences between
generations of users since potential users arrive sequentially. Early arrivers have a longer
flow of benefits from the earlier adoption of a technology. We demonstrated that there is a
tendency towards too early adoption of technologies compared to the social optimum. We
also found that the sponsor of a new emerging technology might choose too safe a research
strategy.
One potential extension of the model would explore the timing of standardization
when there are conflicting technological preferences in the same period (within-period
heterogeneity), especially when there is asymmetry in the valuation of compatibility.
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